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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE
STJI.TE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 15400

-vsGENE H. lvADMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by Information with the Crime
of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-404.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT
The case was tried to the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer,
who found appellant guilty as charged.

At sentencing, Judge

Palmer reduced the crime to a class A misdemeanor and placed
appellant on probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of
the court below.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEME!JT OF FACTS
Sandra Painter, the ex-wife of appellant, testified
that prior to separating from appellant on December 30, 1 976 ,
she had been married to him for three years and that although
no children were born of that union, her three children fror.~
a previous marriage - Monica

(4), Shaun (5), and Lisa (7) _

lived with them (T.B).
Ms. Painter testified that she had been an eyewitnes:
to two incidents of child molestation by appellant in which he
fondled the genitals of her daughter Lisa.

The first instance

occurred on or about November 2 8, 19 7 6, when Ms. Painter was
driving the family home to Syracuse fror.t appellant 1 s sistershouse in Ogden

(T.9-10).

Although appellant had driven to

Ogden to pick up his wife and her children, Ms. Painter testi::oJ
that she drove home because appellant had been drinking and th<Lisa and appellant sat in the rear seat of the Mazda wagon dm~
the ride while Shaun and Monica sat behind the rear seat (T.ll-:1
As she drove along the freeway in Davis County, Ms.
Painter looked in the rearview mirror and observed Lisa sittin:
on apoellant' s lap and appellant 1 s hand inside the front of he:
pants

(T.l4).

minutes

(T.l5).

She stated the activity lasted less than fiR
Ms. Painter continued driving home and admiW'

in court that she never confronted appe 11 an t

1
about either inc:'-

before lodging a criminal complaint, stating that she had
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-2-

~t

known how to handle the situation and she was scared of
appellant (T.21,27,38).
The second incident occurred on December 12, 1976,
11hen ."1s. Painter looked through the slightly open bathroom
door and saw appellant, who had been drinking, rubbing Lisa's
genitals as she stood in the bathtub, while her younger sister
Monica sat playing in the tub (T.l6,19,21).

Ms. Painter observed

the activi~y for three or four minutes (T.20).

She testified

that she heard appellant ask Lisa if it felt good; appellant
subsequently placed Lisa on his lap where he spread her legs
and continued to fondle her genitals and kiss her stomach for
a minute or so (T.21).

Ms. Painter stated she then went back

to the kitchen and called everyone to supper (T.21).
Ms. Painter further testified that on December 30,
1976, she and appellant, who was very drunk, quarrelled.

He

took a shower and dressed only in his undershorts, spent a few
minutes with Lisa in her bedroom (T.23-24).

Appellant then left

the home to go to a party at a friend's home, where he remained
overnight (T.l44-145).

That same evening, Ms. Painter and

her three children moved from the home (T.22) and she and Lisa
had their first conversation about the sexual fondling.

Ms.

Painter testified that she told Lisa that she knew what was
going on and wanted Lisa to tell her about it (T.l27).

Shortly
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thereafter Ms. Painter filed for divorce and contacted the
County Attorney's Office

(T.25).

On cross-examination, some confusion arose as to th(
accuracy of the November 28 date as evidence was introduced
which showed that on that date the family had gone to a movie
and out to dinner

(T.SB-61).

Ms. Painter admitted that the

incident could have occurred on the previous Sunday but was
sure that it happened on a day when she and Pam, appellant's
sister, had gone shopping and appellant had come to Ogden to
pick her up and drive back to their home in Syracuse (T.60-6l
Seven-year-old Lisa \'/adman Painter testified that
the first episode occurred near Thanksgiving in their car as
she and her family were taking Tara home (T.85).
appellant's daughter from a previous marriage

(Tara is

(T.B)).

She

reported that as she sat next to appellant in the rear seat,
he pulled down her pants and put his finger in her "pee-pee"
(T.85-86).

Later Lisa said that after thinking about that e':

some more, she now believed that she was sitting on appellar,:
lap, adding that he had not been drinking (T.lOS-107).
Lisa also described the bathtub episode, testi~~
·
f ~nger
·
;ns
;de of her as she and Monic'
that appellant put h ~s
~
~
sat in the tub

(T.88,115).

She reported that during this t~

he asked her if she was "boy crazy" and then lifted Lisa

0

':

of the tub, placing a towel under Lisa as he sat her on his
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lap {T.89,ll6).

Again he inserted his finger {T.ll7).

In

her childish language Lisa made clear to the court that
appellant's finger was not then-or-ever inserted into her
rectum {T.ll9).

She also reported no pain {T.ll6).

Finally, Lisa described the third occasion of
sexual encounter with appellant.

She testified that one

night appellant entered her bedroom where Lisa stroked his
penis {"pee-pee") until "something cane out" and appellant
again inserted his finger in her vagina {T.88,120).
Dr. Daniel Bergman testified that he examined Lisa
on January ll, 1977, and found no evidence of any trauma to
the vaginal or rectal areas, nor to the legs or lower abdmne-n·{T.72), noting that vaginal insection could have been only
one-half to one centimeter, as deeper penetration would have
damaged the hymen {T.73,77).

Finally, he reported that rectal

insertion would have caused Lisa pain and discomfort {T.77).
Appellant testified on his own behalf, denying all
charges {T.l90,195,196), stating that Lisa must have been told
to lie about him {T.l98) and blaming the entire affair on Ms.
Painter's vindictiveness over their marriage break-up, a
bitterness he claimed was supported by the letter entered as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 {T.l97).
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ARGUtiE~lT

POINT I
AS THE BILL OF PARTICULARS GAVE ONLY AN APPROXIl1ATE
DATE FOR THE COJV'.J1ISSION OF THE FIRST MOLESTATION, AND THE
DATE WAS NOT CRUCIAL TO THE OCCURRANCE OF THE EVENT, THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY WHICH
RELATED THE EVENT TO A DIFFERENT DATE.
The original Bill of Particulars, dated April 28,
1977, included the following information about the first
allegation:
"3. A. The first incident occurred on
or about November 29, 1976, at approximate
(sic) 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. in a car while in
transit from Ogden, Utah, to Syracuse, Utah.
4. A. Incident #1:
Those present were
Sandra Nadman, Lisa \•Jadman, Monica Painter,
Shaun Painter, and the defendant.
5. A. Incident #l:
It is alleged that
the defendant, while in the back seat of
the family stationwagon, did fondle the
genital area of Lisa Wadman." (R.l2-13)
The Amended Bill of Particulars, dated June 13,
1977

(R.lB-19), changed the date of the first incident from

on or about November 29, 1976, to on or about November 28,
1976.

Original and Amended
From the language Of both the

Bills, it is clear that the prosecution was ~ going to prol'e
.
d
· ther November
that the molestation necessarllY occurre on el
roximation,
28th or November 29th; rather the date was an ap P
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indicating that the incident occurred around the Thanksgiving
holidays, although it may have actually happened a few days
before or a few days after the date given in the Bill of
Particulars.

Therefore, the limiting factor is not when the

incident occurred, but where; for the Bill states that the
molestation definitely occurred in appellant's car while the
family was in transit from Ogden to Syracuse.
Given these circumstances, the prosecutor did not
have to submit an Amended Bill as November 28 is "on or about
November 29".

Nevertheless, the state wanted to provide a

date which seemed to be more likely than other dates, acknowledging by the language of approximation that the state would not
and could not prove conclusively the date on which Allegation
*1 occurred.
If the allegation had been linked to an event which
could have been proven to have occurred on a specific day i.e.
arson, bank robbery or murder, then that date would be crucial
and an alibi defense perhaps a perfect defense.

Here, time was

not of the essence of the crime and the changing of the
approximated date in the Bill of Particulars violated none of
appellant's constitutional rights.

In an analogous situation,

the court in state v. Rohletter, 108 Utah 452, 106 P.2d 963
(1945) held that under Utah Code Ann. § 105-17-3 (1943)

(now
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§

77-17-3) no amendment could be made which would
essentially

alter the nature of the case.
in making his defense.

So as to prejudice the defendanc

Here, although it was the Bill of

Particulars which was amended and not the Information, the
principle is the same; for amendments and deviations are
allowed when they are mere changes in form but not substance.
Appellant's defense was that he did not commit the crimes,
although a notice of alibi prompted the changing of the
of Allegation #1.

da~

That denial defense would be the same on

whatever day was established as the date he sat in the rear
I

seat with Lisa on the drive from Ogden to Syracuse.

Therefore,~

appellant suffered no prejudice when the court allowed evidence·[
to come in that related to a different, non-specific day.
The private nature of sexual abuse crimes often
present difficulty in attempting to determine and prove their
exact dates of commission.

The general allegation of the Infor-

mation against appellant, excerpted below and attached hereto,
reveals the wide span of time which covered the three incident'
and by implication acknowledges that specific times for all of
them might be unknown:
.From November, 1976, until
December, 1976, at Syracuse . . . the abovenamed defendant did . . . touch the anus
or any part of the genitals of another,
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Lisa Painter, or otherwise take indecent
liberties with her or cause her to take
indecent liberties with himself 1 with
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, without the consent
of the other."
It is noteworthy that after the Bill of Particulars
was amended no new alibi defense was raised.

The instant

case is, therefore, similar to State v. Mecham, 23 Utah 2d 18,
456 P.2d 156, 157-158

(1969) where appellant was convicted of

indecent assault against an eleven-year-old girl.

The court

made the following pertinent observations in upholding his conviction for the crime which was alleged to have occurred on
Friday, August 2, 1968:
"In support of his attack upon that
finding, defendant places his reliance
upon his denial and the fact that there
was evidence from his wife, his 18-yearold son, his 17-year-old foster daughter,
and a 13-year-old neighbor boy, which
would tend to indicate that the defendant
was around his home and in the presence
of one or more of them during the afternoon of August 2nd and, thus, could not
have committed the offense.
It is noteworthy that the exact date of the offense
was never made a particular issue at the
trial by notice of alibi or otherw~se,
except as the witnesses were quest~oned
as to what happened on that date,
"
That case also was tried without a jury and the court cited
comments by the trial judge which while acknowledging possible
mistake in the August 2nd date, nevertheless provided a basis
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for his judgment against appellant:
"I think the little airl was
telling the truth.
The e;ent may
not have occurred on the 2nd day of
August, but on some date very close
to that time."
In the case at bar, appellant may well have

prov~

beyond a reasonable doubt that the molestation did not occur
on November 2 8.

However, he admitted that he and his family

had made numerous visits to Ogden, where Tara lived, and
that on some occasions he had picked up his wife there to
drive her home

(T.l85), and he could not deny that the particub

trip in question from his sister's home to his had occurred
(T.l99).

He also admitted that on one occasion he had ridden

in the back seat while his wife drove home

(T.l84-185).

There- I

fore, the heart of the state's case concerning Allegation #1
was Lisa's testimony about the incident which she admitted
occurred near Thanksgiving (T. 85).

Thanksgiving was November

25 (T. 53) and "on or about November 29" would include a date
defined as "about Thanksgiving:"
Under this analysis, appellant's argument that the
incident occurred outside the parameters of the Bill of
Particulars is flawed.

Time was not of the essence of the

crime and the state proved to the satisfaction of the trial i·;':'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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)

that on one of the Syracuse-Ogden-Syracuse trips, near Thanksgiving, appellant beyond a reasonable doubt fondled the
genitals of his seven-year-old step-daughter.

That finding

is enough to sustain the verdict, and even if the actual
date of the incident is still undetermined, affirmation is
in order, for every element of the offense was proved beyond
a reasonable doubt and the establishment of a particular date
for Incident #1 related only to evidentiary matters and
potential problems of proof.

Because appellant's defense

suffered no detriment or prejudice, relying on denial and
testimony of friends, and the Bill of Particulars fully
harmonized with the Information and provided adequate_ info_r_-__ _
mation about the incidents so as to enable appellant to
understand the nature of the charges against him and prepare
a defense, respondent urges this court to reject appellant's
argument.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT.
The principles governing the standard of review for
appeals based on allegations of insufficient evidence have
been published and affirmed numerous times.

A succinct state-

ment of those principles appears in State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d
34, 39, 347 P.2d 865 (1959):
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. "The rules governing the scope of
rev1ew on.appeal as to the sufficiency
of the ev1dence to sustain the verdict
are well settled:
that it is the prerogative of the jury to judge the
credibility of the witnesses and to
determine the facts; that the evidence
will be reviewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict; and that
if when so viewed it appears that
the jury acting fairly and reasonably
could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will
not be disturbed."
In the instant case the appellant waived a jury
trial and the district judge became the sole trier of fact.
However, the same standard of review applies to his findings
and his judgment and except for compelling reasons, his
findings will not be disturbed.
Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975), is
particularly helpful for there the court held that it is the
prerogative of the trial court to determine what aspects cl
the evidence he will believe and that in so doing, the tr~l
judge may be selective, choosing those portions of the t~t~
mony of any witness which he thinks has the greater probabiJ!·.
of being true.
In the same vein is the earlier case of DeVas v.
Noble, 13 utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290

(1962), cert. denied 83

s.Ct. 37, 371 u.s. 821, where the court found that due to the
function of the trial judge as determiner of facts and his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-12Machine-generated OCR, may contain
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advantaged position in close proximity to witnesses and
trial, it is his privilege to be the exclusive judge of
credibility of witnesses, weight to be given the evidence,
and findings to be found therefrom.

Respondent submits that

these holidays govern the case at bar.
In his brief, appellant argues that neither Ms.
Painter nor Lisa Wadman Painter were believable because Ms.
Painter was vindictive, bent on revenge against appellant, who
had left her; and Lisa was being controlled by her mother, on
occasion changing her testimony, giving testimony inconsistent
with her mother's, and making statements about appellant's
digital insertion which were likely untrue.

Respondent's

position is that the trial judge carefully considered these
factors in drawing his conclusions, and that because some of
appellant's allegations are true, the judgment of guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt is even more strongly supported and soundly
based.
Lisa Wadman Painter did give testimony inconsistent
with her mother's, acknowledged in respondent's Statement of
Facts and detailed at page ten of Appellant's Brief.

These

inconsistencies actually make her testimony more believable,
rebutting appellant's subtle allegation that Lisa and her ·mother
were in collusion to decieve the court.

Specifically, the
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following excerpts from Lisa's testimony reflect the frankneso
of her answers to sometimes difficult questions during length:
direct and cross examinations.

Respondent submits that the

trial court reasonably was persuaded by her testimony that
this seven-year-old little girl was being subjectively tru~t
even if she was unclear on some matters, and that her credibi:,
being established, her testimony was deserving of great weigh:
Mr. Gennerson first got assurances from Lisa that
she would tell the "'hole truth (T. 8 4) .

He subsequently asked

Lisa if either he or Ms. Painter had told her what to say m•
change her story and Lisa replied that they had not

(T. 90-911

When asked why she had changed her testimony about her sittinon appellant's lap in the car and not next to him she ans1;en
"A.

Because I wasn't sure that time.

Q.

Are you sure now.

A.

Yes.

Q.

\mat happened to make you get sure?

A.

I thinked.

Q.

Who?

A.

I thinked.

You thinked, you have been thinking about
gid somebody talk to you to ask you to be
sure if you wasn't sitting on his lap then?

it?

A.

No.

11

(T.l05)
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On the matter of the digital insertion, Lisa
initially said that she couldn't remember how far into her
appellant pushed his finger, stating only that it didn't
hurt

(T.90,108).

Later Hr. Sharp stated to her that when

they had talked before trial she had said that appellant had
inserted his finger about "this far"

(holding his fingers

spread 1 1/4 to 2 inches) and asked if that was right.
replied, "Yes."

(T.ll6).

Lisa

Although Dr. Bergman did refute

her last response (T.73), respondent submits that her third
response, inconsistent with her first two, was likely a
response to Mr. Sharp's suggestion of that depth, and that
her earlier testimony on the subject was more credible, t~~~~-~
questions having been non-suggestive.
An exchange which rebuts the insinuation of
callusion occurred at T.llS-116, during cross-examination:
"Q.
. .Were you standing up in
the tub or were you sitting down, where
were you?
A.

Sitting down.

*

*

*

Q. Now is that something you
remember pretty well?
A.

Yes.

Q. You are sure you were sitting
in the tub; is that right?
A.

Yes.

*

*

*
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Q. Now,
if your mo~y testified.
in here earlier today that she saw Gene
playing with your pee-pee when you were
standing up in the tub, I guess that's
wrong, is that right?
A.

But I was sitting down."

Respondent submits that taken as a whole and
exemplified by these excerpts, Lisa's testimony merited the
great weight the trial judge gave it, revealed in his comments at sentencing:
"I was persuaded by this little
girl even to the point she corrected
counsel when they would make statements
in examining that she felt were not
true.
I was impressed with her
frankness." (T.224)
Respondent does not rely upon the testimony of Ms.
Painter, acknowledging that the trial judge did not find
persuasive (T.224), but refusing to speculate upon his reason'
for so finding.

However, based upon Lisa's testimony,

and~

of other witnesses and appellant himself, giving each the duE
credibility, the trial judge decided the facts of the case
and found appellant to be guilty as charged.

He had no reasc

able doubts:
"Mr. Wadman, if I had to sit and
listen to what I had to listen to the
other day, if I had to listen to it all
over again, I would have to give the
same decision."
(T.224)
Supported by the principles of ~, Cannon, and
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DeVas, respondent requests this court to uphold the judgment
of the court below.
CONCLUSION

Because the alleged incidents were proven to have
occurred within the dates supplied in the Bill of Particulars,
and the evidence amply supports the judgment, respondent urges
the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

-17-
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--------~~~~~~~THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

--------------------- --------------------

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
INFORMATION

vs.
GENE H. WADMAN I
Defendant.

-----------------------------------------------------------GENE H. WADMAN, having heretofore been duly committed by Cornell M. Jensen, a committing magistrate of this
County to this Court, to answer this charge, is accused by .
the County Attorney of Davis County, by this Information, of
the crime of FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE (76-5-404 UCA) , a felony
of the third degree, as follows·:

From November, 1976~- until

December, 1976, at Syracuse, County of Davis, State of Utah,
the above-named defendant did, under circumstances not-amounting to rape or sodomy, or attempted rape or sodomy, touch
the anus or any part of the genitals of another, Lisa Painter,
or othe~rise take indecent liberties with her or cause her
to take indecent liberties with himself, with intent to arouse
or. gratify the sexual desire of any person, without the consent of the other.
MILTON J. HESS
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY

ByA{,Jq~j_Qc

Rodney s.
ge
Deputy county Attorney
·
wa1."ved by the defendant on the
Preliminary hear1.ng was
23rd day of March, 1977.
The offense set forth in this Information carries a penalty
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